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Abstract
Over the past several decades, dramatic growth and institutional reforms have
taken place in Chinese economy and society. Accompanying this is accelerated
urbanization. However, rather than being a natural consequence of economic
development, and a complex outcome of a reasonable combination of population
urbanization and land urbanization, China’s unique urbanization is characterized by
being local government-led and by the blind pursuit of land expansion. The
relationship between rapid government-led urbanization and the phenomenal land
expansion needs to be understood in the particular fiscal, land management, and
political context. The Tax-sharing system introduced since 1994 has led to a huge
fiscal gap for local governments to provide local public services. As part of
compensation, the monopolistic land management authority has been devolved to
local governments, which in turn provides local governments with substantive power
to pursue local land finance by leasing land-use rights to private developers. With
fiscal incentives and exclusive land administration power, plus the top-down
economy-focused cadre evaluation, local officials are motivated to compete with each
other, leasing as much urban land as possible. Obviously, China’s government-led
and land-centered urbanization has been a serious fiscal, social, and political problem
that is extremely harmful to landless farmers and general residents. The urgent and
also the realistic step to change China’s acceleration of urbanization should start with
replacing the monopolistic land management system by a pluralistic land planning
decision-making arrangement. Such experience can be learned from Canada, where
there are independent appeal bodies to offer the public a substantive and legal channel
to protect their property interest.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Background
The world trend of urbanization has been irreversible since the second half of the
20th century, with the level of urbanization closely correlated with the level of
economic development (Chen, Liu, & Tao, 2013). Over the past decades, there has
been a significant and sustained economic growth in post-reform China, with about 10
percent annual increase (Fan, 2012). Accompanying the fast economic development
as well as the strategy of urbanization acceleration, China’s urbanization from 1980 to
2012 has increased from 19.4 percent to 52.6 percent of the country’s population
(Yang X. J., 2013). Urbanization in China is defined as a complicated and
multifaceted process, which involves population migration from the rural areas to the
urban areas, land expansion, spatial reconfiguration of settlements, and transforming
governance (Gu & Wu, 2010). Compared to other countries, the growing rate of
urbanization in China is much faster than the rate of economic development, and a
concern about relative over-urbanization had emerged (Chen, Liu, & Tao, 2013)
(Yang X. J., 2013). Scholars identify the notion of “over-urbanization” as
excessive-urbanization with the most noticeable evidence of the dramatic increases in
urban land and over-investment in real estate industry (Chen, Liu, & Tao, 2013). As a
consequence, the imbalance between the level of urbanization and the economic
growth would cause a series of social issues, including environmental damages,
shortage of rural labor, pressure of the urban social services, and even crime. Against
this background, it is high time that China should rethink the over-urbanization and
should examine the rationale behind local governments’ pursuance of urbanization.
Throughout China’s developing models of urbanization, there are three main
stages. The first one is the stage of “Urbanization of Small Towns”, which happened
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during the1980s to the 1990s. It started with the rural economic reform, contracting
the land to the household to stimulate the efficient use of the agricultural land. Along
with this was the emergence of the Township and Village Enterprise (TVE) that was
directly invested in by local governments (i.e. the town government). During this
period, the level of urbanization grew from 17.9 percent to 27.5 percent (Zhou W. ,
2014). Secondly, from the 1990s to the 21century, China has experienced the stage of
“Pursuing Increasing Size of Large and Medium Cities”, in which industrialization
has played a key role in promoting the process of urbanization. Specifically, land
commercialization was a tool, with which local governments managed their budget
and local economies, as well as being a means to pursue the increased GDP. In this
situation, the level of urbanization has reached around 27.5 percent to 39.1 percent
(Zhou W. , 2014). Currently, local governments tend to pursue the increased
urbanization of the urban agglomerations, such as Yangtze River Delta and Pearl
River Delta regions. Instead of relying on the industrialization generated from the
Town and Village Enterprises (TVE), local governments depend on raising revenue
from local land. And the level of the urbanization was about 51.3 percent in 2010 and
around 54.77 percent in 2014 (Zhou W. , 2014) (Yang X. J., 2013). (National Bureau
of Statistics of China, 2015)
Additionally, urbanization means both the massive construction and expansion
of urban centers and millions of new urbanites (Rithmire, 2015, p. 188), involving
two dimensions: (1) population urbanization (new city residents), and (2) land
urbanization (new urban areas). During the period from 2000 to 2009, the urban area
grew from 2.24 million hectares to 3.81 million hectares (Tang, Zhou, & Shi, 2014).
Comparing to the annual urban population growth rate of 3.55 percent, the annual
urban land expansion rate is 6.20 percent (Fan, 2012), which indicates that the land
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urbanization is much faster than the population urbanization (Tang, Zhou, & Shi,
2014). Therefore, China’s urbanization is characterized by increases in urban land led
by local governments (Liu & Yin, 2013). And in the process of China’s recent
accelerated urbanization, the key problem is the local governments’ pursuance of land
urbanization, thereby creating an imbalance between the urban population growth and
the urban land expansion, as well as the phenomenon that the urbanization is far
ahead of the economic development. Local government obtained monopoly control
over land and played a key role in land planning, infrastructure construction, and
resident management (Wang & Xiao, 2011).
Against this backdrop, this research examines the rationale behind the local
government’s pursuance of urbanization, and its deep relationship with fiscal reform,
local land management, and the political performance evaluation system of local
cadres by central officials. This paper argues that rather than being a natural
consequence of the economic development and a complex outcome of a reasonable
combination of the population urbanization and the land urbanization, China’s
urbanization in recent decades, especially since the fiscal reform in 1994, can be
identified as a local government-led development (Oi, 1995), deriving from the
municipality’s fiscal incentives, land monopoly authority incentives, and political
incentives. That is to say, while urbanization seems to be an inevitable trend of
economic development, it is actually driven by an unsustainable accumulation regime
that prioritizes the needs of local land fiscal income, real estate development and GDP
growth at the expense of the balance between the level of urbanization and the
economic development, as well as the balance between the population urbanization
and the land expansion.
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1.2 Literature Review
Local government has been seen as the executive, planner, and the guide in
accelerating the process of urbanization through the local land finance, and
urbanization has made a huge contribution to China’s economic development during
the period of social transformation. As the result, urbanization, local land finance, and
the role of local government have attracted great scholarly attention.
First, in the aspect of the process of China’s urbanization, scholars observed that
China’s rapid urbanization has developed far ahead of the economic growth, which
has caused the over-urbanization (Chen, Liu, & Tao, 2013; Yang X. J., 2013; Zhang,
2008). And it is continuously urbanized in accordance with a distinctive feature that is
identified as “land urbanization” (Zhang, 2008; Liu & Yin, 2013;Tang, Zhou, & Shi,
2014; Ye & Wu, 2014; Lin & Yi, 2011). He, Zhou, & Huang define “land
urbanization” as to land conversion from agricultural production to urban
development (2016). That is because this kind of land conversion could generate
revenue from local land finance for local governments, and cities with stronger
economy and higher real estate investment would push more aggressively for land
urbanization (Ye & Wu, 2014). This phenomenon has caused the imbalance between
the land urbanization and population urbanization (Xie, 2016).
Second, as for local land finance, which means local revenues that are generated
out of land directly or indirectly, including (1) land leasing income, (2) tax revenue
generated directly from land use and development (e.g., urban land-use tax, land
Value-added Tax and so on), and (3) tax revenue generated indirectly from land use
and development (e.g., corporate tax and income tax paid by the housing and
construction industries) (Lin G. C., 2014). It has been widely recognized by Chinese
scholars that local land finance has become “the second finance”, accounting for
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nearly 40 percent to 60 percent of the general budget revenue at the local level (Liu &
Feng, 2010; Lin & Yi, 2011; Zhou, 2014). Ong (2014) points out that there is an
increasing reliance by local government on land fiscal income and financing of urban
infrastructure by the local land-leasing revenue. Rithmire (2015, p.1) even shows that
the major political and economic change in China during the last century is actually a
series of land reforms. All these studies can show the significance of land
management and land finance to local governments. And the relation between the
land finance and the acceleration of urbanization is obviously positive as shown in
Zhou’s (2014) study on “Causes and Governance of Local Government Land
Financial Problems in China”. Zhou reveals that the level of urbanization and the
local land finance are mutually dependent, in that the process of urbanization needs
land for industrial, business, and residential usage and vice verse. Local land finance
enables the urban fixed investment on infrastructures designed to attract more people
(2014).
Third, there is great debate and controversy in the role of local governments in
post-reform China. For instance, Su & Chen (2005) point out that there are two major
roles of local governments in the history of land management. Before the 1980s, local
government was the agent of the central state, following the central order and
assisting the implementation of land-related policies. But since the year of 1992, local
governments have been granted the authority of land expropriation and its role has
shifted to that of a corporation that seeks its own interest (Su & Chen, 2005). Jean C.
Oi shows that granting property rights to local government distorts the role of the
latter as the agent of the central government, and then she introduces the notion of
“Local State Corporatism” to see local governments as a rational actor pursusing
revenue while the local official is a political entrepreneur. With the shift from
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administrators to entrepreneurs, local governments are changing from regulators to
advocates of their local enterprises (Oi, 1995). This theory has emerged in China’s
specific fiscal context, which creates the specific fiscal incentives for local
governments to generate local revenue as much as they can. Accompanying the fiscal
reform in 1994 has been the decline of the notion of “Local State Corporatism”, but
Zhan (2015) demonstrates that the incentive of local governments to pursue revenue
has not gone away. Instead of the relying on the Town and Village Enterprise (TVE),
local government has explored a new method to generate local revenues, that is by
expropriating rural land and selling it to developers in the city. This method is now
called local land finance (Zhan, 2015).
1.3 Structure of the Paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows, depicted in Figure 1 in
below. It starts with a descriptive analysis of the “transformation of fiscal incentive”,
as a general context for understanding the most significant reason for China’s local
governments to move on to relying on local land finance to pursue urbanization. It
includes a brief comparison between the Fiscal Contracting System and the
Tax-sharing System and the different powerful effects they had on local governments
in developing the local economy. In the next section, the paper explores the local land
management system and demonstrates the monopoly role of local government in
changing rural land into urban land, which provides the possibility for local
governments to finance urban infrastructures from the city’s land-leasing income
(Ong, 2014). This is followed by a clarification of the political incentive in the
pursuance of the land urbanization, further explaining why local officials choose to
accelerate land development and urbanization. After the exploration of the logic of the
local government-led land urbanization, this paper looks into the impacts of this
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imbalanced urbanization process in China, not only from the resource-erosion and
violation of farmers’ property rights perspectives but also from the standpoint
concerning the social, fiscal, and political issues (Kung, Xu, & Zhou, 2013). And then,
this paper discusses what China can learn from Canada when local governments in
both countries are faced with common dilemmas, such as fiscal constraints and heavy
reliance on land-related revenue. The last gives conclusion.
Figure 1: Structure of the paper

Land Management

Tax-sharing

Political Performance

System

System

Evaluation System

Monopoly Role in
Land Market

Local Land Finance

The Local Government-led Land
Urbanization
:"Mutually Effect
" " :"Lead"to"

Fiscal, Social, and Political Impacts

Local economic
development

! 12!

Chapter 2: Transformation of Fiscal Incentive
In the process of China’s urbanization, a shift of development focus happened at
a time when major institutional changes were made to restructure the fiscal system,
which can also be seen as the main tool that is used to formulate the fiscal
relationships between the central and local governments. This intergovernmental
fiscal relationship determines the capacity of local finance. Since the founding of the
People’s Republic of China, the development of financial systems can be divided into
three major phases, shown in Figure 2 below. At the beginning of China’s Reform
and Opening in 1978, the revenue collection was highly and strictly centralized by the
state, leaving local governments no particular incentives to enhance their local finance.
In this fiscal system, local government was the taxation-collecting agency of the state
at the local level, and most of local tax incomes and profits had to be remitted to the
central government. Meanwhile, local expenditures were heavily relying on financial
transfer from the national budget (Tsai, 2004). During the time period of 1978 to 1993,
a revenue-sharing system called the “Fiscal Contracting System” was introduced
through the fiscal reform, which focused on the decentralization and fiscal bargaining
between the central and subnational governments. This system was designed to
devolve the responsibilities of revenue generation and remittance to local
governments. Because the “lump-sum remittance” was fixed for a long time, this
system had created great incentives to local governments for revenue generation,
through which they could make more surplus revenue to be retained at the local level
(Lin & Yi, 2011). In 1994, due to the declining national share of the budget revenue,
the central government sought to re-boost the state fiscal revenue by implementing a
“Tax-sharing System” (fenshuizhi) (Tsai, 2004; Luo, 2010), in which there are three
categories of revenues: central fixed revenues, local fixed revenues, and shared
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revenues. This fiscal system required local governments to pay a tax proportional to
their local revenues, rather than a fixed, lump-sum remittance (Lin & Yi, 2011).
Figure 2: Three major phases of China’s fiscal reforms since 1978
Year

Tax System

Description

Effects on Local
governments’ incentive

Pre-1978

Centralized

Centralized revenue
collection and transfer

No particular incentive to
boost revenue collection

1978-1993

Fiscal Contracting
System

Decentralization &
Revenue-sharing

Generally increased
revenue collection
incentives, especially for
wealthier provinces

After 1994

Tax-sharing
(Fenshuizhi)

Increasing the center’s
share of budget
revenue

Reclassification of most
shared taxes to local fixed
revenues increases
collection incentive

Source: Summarized from (Tsai, 2004)& (Luo, 2010).
By comparing the latter two fiscal systems in China, this chapter will further
investigate the extent to which the powerful incentives within the different fiscal
systems induce local governments to change their development focus from
industrializing the city to urbanizing it.
2.1 From Fiscal Decentralization to Fiscal Re-centralization
Since the 1980s, an overriding goal of China’s reform has been to improve the
economic efficiency. The Chinese government achieved this essential goal via
regional decentralization. First, the central government downloaded some rights to
local governments to directly set up, invest, and manage enterprises that were
appropriate to their levels, and have them compete with each other on a regional basis
(Kung, Xu, & Zhou, 2013). Second, the fiscal reform introduced in 1978 played an
important role. Under the “Fiscal Contracting System”, local governments were
granted authorities to retain both revenues and profits generated within their own
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jurisdictions. Local governments were entitled to keep that portion of the revenue in
excess of the remitted amount that they negotiated with the state (Kung, Xu, & Zhou,
2013).
The turning point was in 1994 when the central government decided to reshape
the fiscal relationship between central and local governments, and introduced the
“Tax-sharing System” to replace the previous “Fiscal Contracting System” (Lin & Yi,
2011). This new fiscal reform happened because of the severely weakened central
state fiscal capacity in the 1990s. Specifically, the central government’s share of
revenue in overall budgetary revenue had dropped to 22 percent in 1993 from 40.5
percent in 1984 (Kung, Xu, & Zhou, 2013). With the purpose of redefining the fiscal
responsibilities between the central and local governments, lowering the financial
deficits and raising revenue for the central government, standardizing the fiscal
system, and increasing transparency (Lin & Yi, 2011), the “Tax-sharing System” was
seen as a reform to re-centralize the intergovernmental fiscal relationship. As we
mentioned above, there are three categories of revenues, in which Sales Tax is the
central fixed revenue and Business Tax is the local fixed revenue. The Value-added
Tax (VAT), one of the biggest taxes, is categorized as shared revenue, with 75 percent
of the total VAT income remitted to the central government and 25 percent kept by
local governments. Another important type of shared revenue is the Income Tax, of
which 60 percent belongs to the central state and 40 percent remains in city
governments (Lin & Yi, 2011). After this re-centralizing fiscal reform in 1994, the
central government witnessed a great increase in its share of total fiscal revenues,
from 22 percent in 1993 to 55 percent in 2002 (Tsai, 2004). In contrast, the local ratio
of total fiscal revenues experienced a huge decline since 1994, from nearly 80 percent
in 1993 to around 45 percent in 2002(Tsai, 2004). However, local governments’
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expenditure burden for providing public services and public goods did not decline
with their fiscal power and finance capacity (depicted in Figure 3 below). The central
government is responsible for national affairs relating to national defense, armed
police, foreign affairs, and macroeconomic control. Jurisdiction over local
administration expenditures and urban construction and maintenance is vested in local
governments. While the ratio of local fiscal revenues accounting for total fiscal
revenues kept falling, the ratio of local fiscal expenditures to total fiscal expenditures
has remained at about 70 percent. Therefore, the allocation of local revenues and local
expenditures was becoming more and more imbalanced.
Figure 3: Comparison between local fiscal revenues and local fiscal expenditures
Local fiscal revenues

Local fiscal expenditures

Year
Billion
Yuan

Local fiscal revenues/
Total fiscal revenues (%)

Billion
Yuan

Local fiscal expenditures /
Total fiscal expenditures (%)

1993

339.14

78

333.02

71.7

1994

231.16

44.3

392.96

69.1

1995

298.56

47.8

482.83

70.8

2004

1224.11

45.8

2059.28

72.3

2005

1488.42

47.4

2515.43

74.1

2006

1830.36

47.2

3043.13

75.3

2007

2356.5

45.9

3812.04

76.9

Source: China’s Statistical Yearbook in 2008, organized by Yang & Lu (2010).
2.2 From Rural Industrialization to Land Urbanization
The fiscal reform concerning the intergovernmental relationship has changed
from decentralization to re-centralization. It has also transformed local governments’
development focus, from rural industrialization to land urbanization. In the context of
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the “Fiscal Contracting System”, local governments had great fiscal incentives to
generate revenues, especially from non-agricultural enterprises, of which Town and
Village Enterprises (TVEs) were a key component. That is because, as we mentioned
above, since the 1980s, the central government downloaded property rights to local
governments and the latter can directly set up, invest, and manage enterprises that
were appropriate to their levels, and have them compete with each other on a regional
basis (Kung, Xu, & Zhou, 2013). Not surprisingly, under the “fixed finance
remittance” fiscal system, local governments could benefit from the development and
expansion of TVEs by collecting taxes. Actually, TVEs were once an engine of
growth of China’s economy during the period of the 1980s to the 1990s (Kung, Xu, &
Zhou, 2013). Evidence shows that from 1981 to 1990, the total industrial output of
TVEs increased at an average rate of 28 percent, and the productivity of TVEs was
higher than that of State-owned Enterprises (Kung, Xu, & Zhou, 2013). All these
incentives made local governments (especially the county-level and town-level
governments) focus on rural industrialization and rely on the revenue generated from
TVEs.
However, in the process of the re-centralized fiscal reform since 1994, the state
government changed the claims of local governments over tax revenue generated by
their non-state, non-private enterprises (i.e., TVEs). To re-boost the state fiscal
capacity, the “Tax-sharing System” has reduced the share of local governments’
entitlement to several important tax sources (Kung, Xu, & Zhou, 2013). By
re-allocating tax categories and assigning tax rights based no longer on who owns an
enterprise, the fiscal reform in 1994 was essentially characterized by a greatly reduced
of share of revenue for local governments (Kung, Xu, & Zhou, 2013). For example,
the central government reclassified a hefty 75 percent of the Value-added Tax (VAT)
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to itself (Kung, Xu, & Zhou, 2013). And the VAT is one of the most important taxes
to be collected from enterprises and individuals engaged in a market transaction (Lin
& Yi, 2011). The same principle was suitable to Income Tax. And the changing
relative significance of these two taxes in overall budgetary revenues of local
governments was reflected in the growing share of Business Tax that is assigned as
the local fixed revenue, from 20 percent in 1994 to 25 percent in 2003 (Lichtenberg &
Ding, 2009). Moreover, the construction and real estate (CRE) industries have been a
major contributing source of Business Tax revenue. For example, in a county in
Zhejiang province, the Business Taxes levied from the CRE industries accounted for
17 percent of the land-related budgetary revenues, which in turn took up nearly 40
percent of total budgetary revenues (Lichtenberg & Ding, 2009).
This re-centralization of fiscal resources has provided local governments with
great fiscal incentives to engage in construction and infrastructure projects in China’s
process of accelerating urbanization. And for local governments, the benefits of
pursuing the urbanization strategy are not only limited to enhancing residual claims
on the Business Tax. But it is the monopoly right over land planning and development
that gives local governments a more powerful fiscal incentive to urbanize China
(Lichtenberg & Ding, 2009). In order to compensate local governments for the loss
that has resulted from the Tax-sharing System, the State Council issued the Urban
Real Estate Management Law in 1994 and clearly designated city governments as the
“landlord” (Kung, Xu, & Zhou, 2013) (Rithmire, 2015, pp.56-57). In particular, the
central policy-makers allowed the local land-lease fees to be included into revenues
for local budget. Therefore, as with the powerful fiscal incentives of the Fiscal
Contracting System on the explosive growth of TVEs in the 1980s (Kung, Xu, &
Zhou, 2013), the strong fiscal incentives provided by the Tax-sharing System in 1994
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are the shift of development focus from industrialization to urbanization, as well as
local governments’ pursuit of local land finance. Land-related income has become
one of the most important sources of local revenue generation, and it is under the
direct control of city and county governments (Lin & Yi, 2011).
2.3 Local Land Finance in China
Local land finance (tudi caizheng) has been seen as a unique term in China, and
it has been a fact that China’s local governments attempt to increase land finance
revenues to deal with the growing responsibilities and liabilities of social and
economic development (Lin G. C., 2014). In recent years, the land finance has
become “the second finance” of local governments, and it has taken up nearly 40
percent to 60 percent of the overall budgetary revenue at the local level (Liu & Feng,
2010). Specifically, as shown in Figure 4, the revenues collected from land lease (to
be discussed more in next chapter), which is monopolized by local governments have
contributed to the biggest source of unregulated and unshared revenues for many local
governments in China (Kung, Xu, & Zhou, 2013). The ratio of land leasing income to
local government total revenue grew from 16.6 percent in 2001 to more than 50
percent in 2007 (Liu & Feng, 2010). In turn, local governments are heavily relying on
and focusing on construction and real estate industries. It is reported that real estate
investment funds invested in the development land and property have grown from 2
percent of GDP in 1992 to about 13 percent in 2011(Rithmire, 2015, pp. 31). In other
words, land commodification has made a great contribution to municipal finance.
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Figure 4: The ratio of the land-leasing income accounting for the total local revenue
Year

A: Nationwide land-leasing
income (Billion Yuan)

B: Nationwide total local
revenues (Billion Yuan)

2001

129.6

780.3

16.6

2002

241.7

851.5

28.4

2003

538.5

985

54.7

2004

589.4

1189.3

49.6

2005

550.5

1510.1

36.5

2006

767.7

1830.4

41.9

2007

1194.8

2357.3

50.7

Ratio (A/B) (%)

Source: Liu & Feng, 2010, Taxation Research.
Actually, local land finance is a by-product of the Tax-sharing System, as well as
a key contribution to local governments’ pursuit of land urbanization. Based on the
general contours of the Tax-sharing System, it is easy to understand that, because of
the decreasing share of local revenues plus increasing responsibilities of providing
local public goods and services, local governments are faced with an enormous fiscal
gap. That is to say, with the devolution of fiscal power from the central government to
cities, many of the central government’s responsibilities, including providing the
urban public goods such as health, education, and transport, were also downloaded to
cities. So municipal governments have to meet their expenditures from their
own-source revenues (Wang, Zhang, Zhang, & Zhao, 2011). To deal with this
dilemma, most localities eventually prefer to rely on land finance by accelerating land
urbanization.
Depicted in Figure 5 below, as Luo (2010) points out, to fill the fiscal gap, local
governments normally have two alternatives: one is to enhance the budgetary
revenues, and the other is to gain the extra-budgetary revenues. On the one hand, as
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demonstrated on the left side of Figure 5, in order to enhance budgetary revenues,
local governments can achieve this goal by increasing the shared revenues that
contain the Value-added Tax (VAT) and the Income Tax, etc. These two types of
taxes both depend on the secondary industry that is also in line with the growth of
GDP. The problem is that to develop the secondary industries, resources like capital
and land are necessary. To attract more industrial investment, local officials tend to
offer concessions (i.e., low-cost expropriated land from rural areas), ignoring the
market principles of land management. Considering that only 25 percent of the
Value-added Tax and 40 percent of the Income Tax remain with cities, it is difficult
for local governments to make up for the lost revenues only by expanding the shared
revenues. Within the budgetary revenues, the Business Tax has replaced the
Value-added Tax and Income Tax, becoming an important source of local revenues.
As we discussed above, the Business Tax consists primarily of taxes collected from
the construction and real estate sectors in the acceleration of land expansion (Kung,
Xu, & Zhou, 2013). To be more specific, there is a growing share of Business Tax
accounting for the local total revenues, slightly increasing from 20 percent in 1994 to
25 percent in 2003 (Lichtenberg & Ding, 2009).
On the other hand, illustrated on the right side of Figure 5, as the Tax-sharing
System is a re-centralized fiscal reform that is aimed to enhance the central fiscal
capacity, it is still hard to close the financial gap only by increasing the budgetary
revenues. Therefore, pursuing the revenue out of the budget, which also means being
under less supervision of the central government, turns out to be the most common
instrument for a municipality to deal with fiscal constraints. And in the
extra-budgetary revenues, local land-leasing income has taken up the biggest part, an
income stream over which it has been assigned exclusive rights by the central
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government (Lichtenberg & Ding, 2009). This part of extra-budgetary revenues can
indeed be substantial, and can make up for the loss revenues that have been remitted
to the central government as a result of fiscal reform in 1994 (Lichtenberg & Ding,
2009).
Figure 5: Tax-sharing System, local land finance, and land urbanization
Tax-sharing System

Fiscal Gap

Budgetary Revenues

Extra Budgetary Revenues

Shared Revenues

Local fixed Revenues

Value-added Tax

Business Tax

(VAT)(25%remained)

Land Using Tax

Land Development &
Land Leasing Income

Income Tax
Urbanization Effects

(40%remained)

Secondary Industry
Town-and-Village Enterprises
(TVEs)

Construction
& Real Estate
Development

Political Performance Incentive:
Attracting Investment

Industrialization Effects
Concessional Terms: Occupy the agricultural land

: Lead to

: Include

Monopoly of resources

: Rely on

Source: Author summarized and re-organized based on Luo’s Research (2010).
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For some cases, the land-leasing income is even categorized as non-budgetary
revenue, which leaves local authorities great fiscal capacity. For example, according
to the study conducted by Kung, Xu, & Zhou (2013), in S county in Zhejiang
province, profits made from land revenues consist of three categories (shown in
Figure 6 below): (1) budgetary revenues (i.e., taxes) including direct land taxes and
indirect land taxes (i.e., Business Tax collected from construction and real estate
industries), (2) extra-budgetary revenues (i.e., land fees), and (3)non-budgetary
revenues (i.e., land leasing income). In S county, land-leasing income becomes the
sole source of non-budgetary revenues that are under little central supervision. And
the profits made from land lease are much more than the sum of profits made from
budgetary and extra-budgetary land revenues.
Figure 6: Profits made from land revenues in S county in 2003
Profits made from land revenues in S county in Zhejiang province
Category

Profits (Million Yuan)

Budgetary revenues

Item

Ratio

Direct Land Taxes

14% of budgetary revenues

Indirect Land Taxes

26% of budgetary revenues

519.8

Extra budgetary revenues

510

Land fees

51.5% of extrabudgetary revenues

Non-budgetary revenues

1920

Land leasing income

100% of non-budgetary revenues

Source: (Kung, Xu, & Zhou, 2013)
Actually, the central government has realized the irregularity of local land
finance and has tried to standardize it. In 2006, the State Council issued a notice to
regulate the local management of the land-leasing income. According to Article 4 of
this notice, all the amount of incomes and expenses for land lease shall be
incorporated into the budget (General Office of the State Council, 2006). Additionally,
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according to Article 4 of the Budget Law of the People's Republic of China (2014
Amendment), all government revenues and expenditure shall be included in a budget.
Given the elastic land prices during the land-leasing process, it leaves local
governments some room to implement over budget. Most importantly, the fiscal
incentive for local government to pursue land finance still keeps unchanged.
Therefore, since the Tax-sharing System reform in 1994, the profits generated
from land lease by local governments have been set as the main source of the local
revenues for cities (Liu & Feng, 2010). Local governments’ exclusive fiscal power
over land finance is a by-product as well as a “compensation” of the fiscal reform in
1994. However, the fiscal incentives of local governments in promoting land
urbanization could only be feasible in a monopolistic environment of local land
management. These fiscal incentives and monopoly incentives encourage and
empower local officials to accelerate land urbanization to fill the fiscal gap.
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Chapter 3: Monopoly Incentive: Land Management System
Land management is an important administrative activity, aimed to protect
property rights and organize land-use planning. Actually, from 1949 to 1978, to be
consistent with the highly centralized Planned Economy System, China’s land
distribution was mainly conducted by administrative allocation controlled by the state,
for an unlimited period of time, and free of charge (Cao F. , 2013). Since the reform
and opening in the 1980s, land commercialization has been introduced in China. The
land-use is no longer free of charge and the duration of the land-use right is limited
depending on the usage of land. With the development of the high-speed economy
and unprecedented restructuring of rural and urban areas, scarce land resources have
become a crucial instrument and an easy way for local governments in China to
generate revenues. As shown in Figure 7 below, China’s current land management
system contains four main sections: land property system, land-planning system, land
conversion system, and land expropriation. They mutually affected each other.
Figure 7: China’s current Land Management System
Mutual Effect
Land Property System

Land-planning System

Based on

Based on

Land Conversion System

Land Expropriation
Mutual Effect

Source: Re-organized based on the study conducted by Liu, Su, Long, & Hou (2013)
Local land finance is built on the dualistic structure of land rights as well as local
governments’ monopoly authority over land administration (Zhou W. , 2014). In this
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situation, local governments not only have fiscal incentives to pursue land finance by
accelerating land urbanization but also have the exclusive power to do so. Therefore,
urbanization can be seen as a multidimensional phenomenon that is unique in terms of
the speed, scale, and government-driven nature (Ye & Wu, 2014). In this chapter, the
author will discuss more of China’s land management system, focusing on the
monopoly role of local governments in the process of transforming rural lands into
urban lands.
3.1 Dualistic Structure of Land Rights: Rural and Urban Areas
In China, reflecting in the land property system, all land is formally under public
ownership. The distinction between the land ownership and land-use right is the most
outstanding point that distinguishes China’s land management system from western
countries. To be more specific, as stated in the Constitution of The People’s Republic
of China, land in cities is owned by the state while land in rural areas is owned by the
collective (National People's Congress, 1982). An organization or individual is not
allowed to buy, sell or otherwise engage in the transfer of land by unlawful means
(National People's Congress, 1982). But the right to the use of land can be transferred
according to law (Wang W., 2013). Additionally, “the state may, in the public interest
and in accordance with law, expropriate or requisition land for its use and make
compensation for the land expropriated or requisitioned” (National People's Congress,
1982). Based upon the Constitution, the legal framework that further shapes the
land-use rights is the 1988 Land Administration Law, which was first drafted in 1986
and then revised in 1988 (Ding, 2003). In this fundamental land management law, the
public ownership of land means that the State Council, as the representative of the
state, has the authority to exercise the ownership of the state-owned land (Wang W.,
2013). However, in real life, this authority is devolved to subnational governments to
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implement the right of land planning, land expropriation, land leasing, and other
land-related activities. In order to provide legal guidance, the State Council issued the
Provisional Regulation On the Granting and Transferring of the Land Rights over the
State-owned Land in Cities and Towns in 1991, in which land users of the urban
state-owned land are allowed to transfer, rent, and mortgage the land-use rights (Ding,
2003). In contrast, the rural collective-owned land is forbidden to enter into the land
market directly. For example, it cannot mortgage the land. Rural collective-owned
land can only be used for non-agricultural use or transferred in the land market when
it has been expropriated as the urban state-owned land by local governments.
Thus, when the conversion of rural collective-owned land is still under a
stringent administrative restriction that is monopolized by local governments
(Lichtenberg & Ding, 2009), the Law has legalized private organizations or
individuals to access the state-owned land in the attempt to develop the land market
(Ding, 2003). This legal and regulatory system, to some extent, makes local
governments the sole institution that combines the right of ownership, the authority of
operation, and the power of management (Wang W. , 2013).
Furthermore, the urban land belongs to the state and is under the administration
of city governments that lease out the land-use rights to private developers under
long-term (40 to 70 years) contracts. The village collectives own rural land and have
the authority to allocate land for rural housing and village public works in addition to
agriculture. Any other use of rural land requires a change in status from
collective-owned to state-owned, accomplished by a process of land expropriation
(Lichtenberg & Ding, 2009). This dualistic structure of land rights between rural areas
and urban areas is the premise of the land conversion system and affects both: (1)
holder of the property right, and (2) access to the land market.
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On the one hand, rural land (except some specific areas of land such as those
used by the military) belongs to rural collectives, mainly including the village
committees and villagers. However, it is very ambiguous to define who exactly the
collective is (Luo, 2010). Within the municipal planning areas, village institution “on
behalf” of villagers makes decisions on land expropriation (Li, Xu, & Li, 2010),
Farmers, as nominal owners, tend to lose their legal protection from being
expropriated by local officials, especially when they are faced with the land
acquisition in the public interest. Individuals have no substantial power to negotiate.
On the other hand, property rights of the rural collective-owned land cannot be
exchanged directly in the market. That is to say, the rural collective property cannot
be transferred, converted, and leased out for non-agricultural use. Against such a
backdrop, the process of developing rural land for urban development has to start with
the land expropriation led by local governments in their land-use plans, transforming
the nature of the land from rural collective-owned land to urban state-owned land.
The restrictions on the conversion of collective property mean that local governments
play a monopolistic role in the land market, excluding the rural collectives from the
market place for land (Luo, 2010). So the property rights over urban lands can be
transferred at a market price while rural lands are still regulated under the mechanism
of “the planned economy” (Li, Xu, & Li, 2010).
Therefore, the dualistic structure of land rights between rural areas and urban
areas is unfair for farmers. Unlike urban individuals who have the full property rights
of state-owned land, farmers only have limited property rights of rural
collective-owned land (Li, Xu, & Li, 2010). These imbalanced, ambiguous, and
limited land rights of peasants easily make them become victims of so-called “public
interest” in the process of land expropriation. In addition, the dualistic structure of

! 28!

land rights has engendered a special procedure of land conversion from rural land to
urban land, which leaves local governments a huge amount of land rent residuals.
3.2 How Rural Land Becomes Urban Land?
For local governments, selling the use right of state-owned land to private
developers makes a great contribution to raising finance funds for urban construction
in cities (Wang, Zhang, Zhang, & Zhao, 2011). The inevitable expansion of urban
land has been noted. For one thing, with the abolition of the agricultural tax in 2006 to
relieve peasants’ burdens, local governments were forced to eliminate another
significant source of fiscal revenue (Rithmire, 2015, p. 181). Local governments, in
pursuit of both economic growth and fiscal revenues, are interested in expropriating
rural land for urban use. The compensation paid to farmers is based on the value of
crop production and determined by an administrative formula. It is meager compared
to what local governments would obtain in selling these expropriated land rights in
the land market (Kung, Xu, & Zhou, 2013). For another, with the development of the
local economy and city sprawl, the demand for urban state-owned land used for city
construction in the process of urbanization has experienced a soaring increase in past
decades in China. Meanwhile, the existing stock of urban land could not meet the
development needs. Occupying the rural land has been an inevitable instrument for
local governments to finance urban services and development projects (He & Wu,
2008) (Tang, Zhou, & Shi, 2014).
As depicted in Figure 8 below, the process of transferring the rural
collective-owned land into urban state-owned land starts with land expropriation led
by local authorities. Although only provincial governments are empowered to convert
the status of land, city governments often seek to influence provincial authorities to
approve the land-use plan for the public interest (i.e., public infrastructure, urban
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transportation). In this phase, farmers are passive when their lands are expropriated
for the public interest, and they are too weak to protect their land-use rights through
their limited property rights. Basically, local governments can expropriate any piece
of rural collective-owned land. Even though compensation is required, it is not based
on market prices. “The compensation is determined by an administration formula
based mainly on agricultural productivity and also including the payment for land,
crops currently in cultivation, attachments to land, and the land improvements”
(Lichtenberg & Ding, 2009). Normally, the compensation made for the conversion of
rural farmland is much lower than that of urban land.
Figure8: The process of changing the rural land into urban land in China

Rural Area
Land Primary Market

Urban Area
Source: Organized by the author.
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rural-collective-owned land flows into the land primary market1 that is monopolized
by local authorities. In this stage, city governments sell land-use rights to developers
for urban construction projects (i.e., commercial, residential, and industrial programs)
for a fixed period of time. This process of land leasing must go through public tender
and auction at a market price (Lin & Yi, 2011). Once developers obtain the use-right
to develop the newly converted urban state-owned land, they need to pay relevant
taxes to local governments, including land leasing fees, construction fees, and
land-using tax (Ding, 2003), which will cover compensation for farmers and cost of
newly built urban infrastructures (Su & Chan, 2006).
It is not surprising to find that local governments have great fiscal incentives to
change the rural collective-owned land into the urban state-owned land. Compared to
the tax-free policy for agricultural use land in rural areas, revenues generated from
urban state-owned land become the main source of local finance. China’s special land
market tends to appreciate the value of urban state-owned land but depreciates the
value of rural collective-owned land.
3.3 Monopoly Role of Local Government in the Land Market
As we discussed above, in China’s land management system, local governments
combine multiple roles, including substantive land ownership, land-use planning, and
land leasing. As the representative of the state, local governments possess a significant
monopoly role in the land market.
First, in the aspect of land expropriation, local governments can requisition almost
any piece of rural land in the name of the public interest. The definition of “public
interest” is so vague that local governments are free to expropriate agricultural land
1!

Primary land market: platform used for the transaction of land-use rights
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whenever they want (Ong, 2014). As the leading institutions, local governments even
determine the compensation for farmers. Given that he compensation is based on crop
productivity rather than the commercial value, local governments and private
developers will gain great profits in land development.
Second, in terms of land-leasing process, local governments are in an absolutely
dominant position. The primary land market would be monopolized and controlled by
local governments, which are the exclusive owners of the land (Rithmire, 2015, p.53).
Indeed, to avoid the secret transaction of land, the land leasing must be undertaken
through a more transparent “market transaction”, such as public tendering, auctioning,
and listing (Lin G. C., 2014). However, local governments, as the only “landlord”,
have formed an artificial natural monopoly over the land transactions. The
introduction of these means of market transaction has not changed local governments’
monopoly role in operating the urban state-owned land. They can still easily raise
land-leasing prices. It is reported that land related cost (i.e., land leasing fees, land
using tax, construction tax) takes up nearly 65 percent of a commercial housing price
(Su & Chen, 2005).
Third, from the perspective of the usage of land-leasing income, local
governments have a monopoly role in allocating revenues from local land finance.
According to central regulation, there should be at least 10 percent of land-leasing
income that is used for public housing or affordable housing fund. However, in China's
22 cities, including Shanghai, Beijing, Chongqing, and Chengdu, the ratio is much
lower than the requirement (Yang J. , 2011). Local governments have great autonomy
in allocating the land-leasing income, which comprises about 45 percent of the total
local revenues (Su & Chen, 2005). Therefore, local governments have the monopolistic
authority over the conversion of land-ownership rights from collective to state
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ownership, the rights to convert from agricultural to non-agricultural use, and the
influence on local land finance including land-leasing income and compensation for
land expropriation.
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Chapter 4: The Political Incentive and The Cadre Evaluation System
The fiscal incentives brought about the “Tax-sharing System” and the monopoly
incentives from the land management system could only be applicable under China’s
special context of political centralization. At the state level, the central government has
the authority to appoint local officials directly and to control local personnel
arrangement. At the subnational level, local cadres are empowered with great
autonomy and authority in developing the economy within their jurisdictions. They can
easily affect local policy decisions. Even though constitutionally China is defined as a
unitary state, when measured by the authority of managing the local land resources as
well as the extra-budgetary revenue, China is currently the most decentralized country
in the world (Ong, 2011).
And these two aspects above are linked together by the top-down cadre evaluation
system. So the political incentive, which is embedded in local cadres’ career
development, is another significant element that accelerates local governments’ pursuit
of land urbanization. This section discusses the major features of China’s cadre
evaluation system and explores the relation between local officials’ promotion and land
urbanization.
4.1 Economy-focus and Regional Competition
The main content of China’s cadre evaluation system is the political performance
evaluation of local cadres by central officials, which is characterized by top-down
centralization. For one thing, through the appointment and removal of local officials
that are dominated by the central government, local governments remain subject to
central control (Zhou W. , 2014). For another, the political performance measurement
guarantees the achievement of goals set by the central government, especially the
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economic development goals. In particular, the target-based responsibility system
(TRS) is the main performance measurement system that is used to monitor and
manage local officials’ implementation of central policies. Obviously, there is a
positive correlation between the career prospects of local cadres and their achievement
of required policy goals (Gao, 2015).
As local governments are mainly under the oversight of upper-level governments
rather than the horizontal supervision of local people or mass media (Zhou L. , 2007), to
get promoted, local officials need to hand in a good performance to the upper-level
leaders during their tenure. Among the performance indicators, the growth of per capita
GDP, employment rates, and tax revenues are the most important metrics, on which
local officials’ political careers within the Party and government crucially depend
(Kung, Xu, & Zhou, 2013). And these performance indicators totally reflect the
target-based responsibility system (TRS). For example, 60 percent of targets required
of local officials in cadre evaluation system are related to economic construction
(Kung, Xu, & Zhou, 2013). Compared to the qualitative indicators, such as social
stability and local residents’ happiness, these economy-focused indicators are more
measurable and comparable. It provides local cadres with strong political incentives
to accelerate economic growth (Zhou L. , 2007).
Reginal competition is another unique feature of China’s cadre evaluation. As a
unitary state, China’s administrative structure is in the form of a pyramid. Local
officials have to compete with each other to get promoted. It means that when
upper-level leaders measure the political performance of local cadres, they tend to
compare within the regional jurisdiction. The comparison is a powerful informal
pressure on local cadres. For instance, top-ranking township cadres have a high
opportunity to be promoted at the county level while well-performing municipal

! 35!

officials are more likely to be transferred to other provinces as governors (Kung, Xu, &
Zhou, 2013). In this context, local officials not only need to focus on increasing the
local GDP but also should pay attention to improving the regional rank (Zhou W. ,
2014). It is undeniable that the regional competition has enhanced local cadres’ focus
on the local economy and has made a great contribution to China’s rapid economic
development. It is estimated that every 15 percent increase in the likelihood of local
officials' promotion will bring a 0.06 percent growth of local GDP (Liu, Wu, & Ma,
2012). But it has also led to a series of distortionary consequences (Zhou L. , 2007),
among which the most serious one is the acceleration of imbalanced land urbanization.
4.2 Local Officials’ Promotion and Land Urbanization
Under the great pressure of closing the fiscal gap since 1994 and the regional
tournament competition, local officials are pushed to take on the role of land developers,
using their exclusive power over land management to promote economic growth and
meet the development targets (Lichtenberg & Ding, 2009). Two main incentives for
local officials to accelerate land urbanization are revenue generation and investment
attraction, and both of them are accompanied by GDP growth.
To be more specific, firstly, as we discussed above, land urbanization is widely
seen as the key to generating revenues. On the one hand, as the most important tax
category, the Business Tax has been a driving force in local land urbanization. Nearly
50 percent of these revenues are generated from the construction and real estate (CRE)
industries (Kung, Xu, & Zhou, 2013). Furthermore, the CRE helps spur local GDP
growth, which will also enhance the career prospects of local officials. According to
one estimate, residential property construction alone contributes to around 10 to 12
percent of country’s GDP (Ong, 2014). On the other hand, considering the limited stock
of urban land, plus the high compensation paid for urban land demolition, urban
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expansion, and accompanying land expropriation and land leasing are another major
drivers of increases in revenues and local GDP. So, as we discussed above, local
governments can gain substantial revenues from the conversion of the nature of the
rural land, and these conversions are preconditions of any property development (Ong,
2014).
Secondly, urban land is a crucial tool to attracting investment. Since the opening
and reform, the state has devolved economic discretion to local governments to
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of local development. This economic
decentralization promotes the investment-driven economic growth model in China.
Therefore, in the regional tournament competition, attracting investment has been the
most significant mechanism for local officials in enhancing the local economy (Zhang,
Wang, & Xu, 2011). Additionally, to compete for advancement with officials from
other localities, investment attraction also gives local cadres access to sources of wealth
and power within their local communities (Lichtenberg & Ding, 2009). In the game of
attracting investment, urban land is not only seen as the fundamental resource but also a
special means used for preferential policy. For example, some local governments may
lower the compensation paid to farmers, to reduce the cost of land expropriation. Or,
some other local officials may commit to giving developers land-related tax
exemptions to invite investment. In turn, the investment will enlarge the tax base,
increase GDP, and promote the local employment (Qu & Li, 2010).
Compared to population urbanization that is less related to economic development,
land urbanization would bring a large amount of revenues and investments, along with
a higher GDP in a short period (Zeng, 2016). Therefore, to obtain a greater opportunity
of promotion, local officials are indeed strongly motivated to accelerate land
urbanization (Kung, Xu, & Zhou, 2013).
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Chapter 5: Impacts of the Government-led land urbanization
Based on what we discussed above, it is obvious that China’s acceleration of
urbanization is land-centered (i.e., pursuing local land finance) and government-led
(i.e., local officials leading and guiding the process of land conversion). In this unique
process, China’s has experienced great economic growth as well as a huge urban
sprawl. However, as the most important engine of urban development, the
government-led land urbanization has several negative impacts. Actually, these
disadvantages penetrate the Tax-sharing System, land management system, and cadre
evaluation system, which can be reflected in aspects of fiscal concerns, social issues,
and governmental problems.
5.1. Unstable Local Fiscal Revenues
Unstable local fiscal revenues result in both unsustainability and unpredictability.
On the one hand, land-leasing income, as the main source of local fiscal revenues,
heavily relies on the limited land resources. If the resource of land itself is not
sustainable, neither is the land-based fiscal revenue (Choa & Choi, 2014).On the other
hand, without a market-oriented land-leasing procedure between local authorities and
real estate developers, land finance income can be seen as an invisible revenue
monopolized by city governments. This paves the way for local governments to
commercialize regional land under less supervision from the central authority.
Specifically, the non-institutionalized profit distribution among stakeholders (i.e., city
governments, real estate developers, farmers of expropriated rural land, and urban
housing buyers) makes the land finance more unstable due to its unpredictability
(Choa & Choi, 2014). From a long-term perspective, these invisible land revenues,
especially extra-budgetary revenues, should be standardized by the state in the future.
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5.2. Loss of Farmland
The extraordinarily strong fiscal, monopolistic, and political incentives for local
governments to boost land urbanization have caused serious consequences, especially
involving the loss of farmland. According to official statistics from China’s Ministry
of Land and Resources, from 1996 to 1999, urban land has witnessed a growth at an
average of nearly 213,000 hm2 per year. And this annual increase reached about
262,000 hm2 during the period from 1999 to 2004 (Lichtenberg & Ding, 2009).
Additionally, the urban built-up area was 2.24 million hm2, 2.8million hm2, and 3.81
million hm2 in 2000, 2007, and 2008 respectively (Tang, Zhou, & Shi, 2014) (Zhao &
Zhang, 2009). Among these new urban built-up areas, land converted from rural land
has taken up the biggest part. From 2002 to 2008, the annual construction land
occupied the arable land is about 224,000 hm2, with the nationwide land expropriation
rising from 196,000 hm2 in 2004 to 451,000 hm2 in 2009 (Tang, Zhou, & Shi, 2014).
As shown in Figure 9, the proportion of arable land in the land expropriation for
urban expansion has remained around more than 40 percent from 2003 to 2008.
Figure 9: Ratio of arable land to land expropriated for urban expansion
Year

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Ratio

49.1%

38.3%

47.8%

48.7%

36.8%

45.9%

Source: (Zhou W. , 2014)
To protect the farmland, the central government has fixed a minimum of 120
million hm2 of the cultivated field as the “red line” limit. However, this restriction is
just a palliative remedy and seems to have little effect on local governments (Zhang,
Wang, & Xu, 2011). Local officials can always find a way to maximize land for lease
(more details in this chapter below).
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5.3. Violation of Farmers’ Land Rights
As the nominal owner of the rural land, farmers’ land rights are vulnerable.
Once land use is changed and ownership transferred (from collective to state), farmers’
land rights cease to exist. The violation of their land rights can be found in three
major aspects. First, as we discussed earlier, city governments are empowered to
expropriate rural land in the public interest, and farmers tend to have no choice when
their lands are “spotted” by local authorities. It is not surprising that violent conflicts
between villagers and local authorities over land disputes repeatedly occurred in the
process of urban expansion (Kung, Xu, & Zhou, 2013). To some degree, this is the
only way for farmers to protest. Second, farmers of expropriated land have no power
to negotiate compensation with local authorities. The disproportionate allocation of
the land profits in the process of land expropriation has made farmers become the
biggest victims (shown in Figure 10).
Figure 10: Profit allocation among stakeholders in land expropriation
Stakeholders

Local Governments

Real Estate Developers

Ratio

20%-30%

40%-50%

Village Committees Farmers
25%-30%

Source: (Zhao & Zhang, 2009)
Only 5 to 10 percent of the profits made from the expropriated land belongs to
farmers, while 20 to 30 percent of that flows into local governments’ fiscal revenues
(Zhao & Zhang, 2009). Third, without the arable land, some farmers lose the main
resource that enables them to make a living. In the long term, landless farmers face
with various social problems, such as unemployment and difficult in educating their
descendants (Su & Chen, 2005). In part because of China’s Hukou system, a system
that makes it impossible for villagers with rural resident status to freely enjoy urban
public services. For example, according to the National Bureau of Statistics, among

5%-10%
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2670 land-expropriated farmers from 16 provinces, about 46 percent of them
experienced a decline in income after the land acquisition (Zhao & Zhang, 2009).
5.4. Unreasonable High Housing Price
Accompanying the land urbanization is the excessive investment in the real estate
and construction industries, which could easily cause bubbles in the property market.
As a matter of fact, urban housing prices in China’s many large cities have
experienced an extraordinary growth since 2003 (Choa & Choi, 2014). For instance,
in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou, housing prices in the open market
have at least doubled in the last 5 years. The main reason for such an increase is the
rapid growth of the cost of land-use right in the primary land market monopolized by
local governments. To gain more revenues from land leasing, local governments can
easily manipulate the price of urban land by controlling the supply of the usable
state-owned land. Furthermore, they can also influence the housing prices by
adjusting land-related taxes. For example, during the financial crisis in 2008, to
protect the real estate and construction industries, which are the main source of local
fiscal revenues, some local governments even canceled the Business Tax to encourage
people to buy a house (Wanf & Yang, 2012).
5.5. Short-sighted Behaviour of Local officials
Stimulated by the huge amount of land leasing residuals, as well as the career
promotion incentive, land urbanization may result in local officials' short-sighted
behaviors. To win the regional tournament competition, most of China’s local cadres
set promoting economic growth and accelerating urbanization as the highest priorities
(Lichtenberg & Ding, 2009). The most important things that local officials care about
are how to generate revenues and boost the local GDP in a short time (Chen Y. ,
2014). Therefore, they will lease as much land-use right as possible to private
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developers (Cao, Feng, & Tao, 2008). This government-led land urbanization will not
be beneficial for the optimization and standardization of land use in the long term
(Zhang, Wang, & Xu, 2011).
5.6. Abuse of Public Authority and Loss of Public Trust
Monopoly power is always the breeding ground for corruption, so is local
governments’ exclusive authority over urban land management. In China, land
finance is seen as one of root causes of the chaos of land market, illegal land use, and
local corruption (Zhou W. , 2014). As the only “landlord”, local governments in
China can easily seek rents in the process of land urbanization (Zhou W. , 2014). To
be precise, in 2003, there were 168,000 cases involving in illegal land use that were
investigated, among which almost all of them were related to local officials (Su &
Chen, 2005). In 2004, in Guangdong province, there were more than 2000 cases of
illegal land use. In the 8 typical cases that were reported and investigated by
Provincial Land and Resources Office, 3 of them were related to town governments’
illegal land acquisition and 4 of them were related to village committees’ illegal land
occupancy (Su & Chen, 2005). In 2008, the central government classified the field of
land as one of the six key areas in commercial bribery (Chen Y. , 2014). In this
situation, growing local corruption has destroyed the credibility of local governments.
5.7. Antagonism Between the Central and Local Government
Land urbanization has resulted in antagonism between the central and local
governments, regarding the quota of land expropriated for non-arable use, the
development of real estate and construction industries, and the supply of affordable
housing. For one thing, realizing the potential value of land development, the Ministry
of Land Resource imposed a land control hierarchy that would use land as a tool to
regulate the macro economy. The central government determines how much land
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would be available for local governments to lease to urban development in the various
regions and in the country as a whole (Rithmire, 2015, p. 61).
The 1998 revision of the Land Management Law established quotas of land
available for development for every level of government from top down,
requiring that all local governments preserve more than 80 percent of the total
arable land under their respective administration and receive approvals for
conversion of farmland into land for urban construction (Rithmire, 2015, p. 62).
However, in practice, there is always a way for local governments in China to
maximize land for lease and urban expansion while also keep their assigned quotas
(Rithmire, 2015, p. 62). For example, they can transfer development rights among
jurisdictions to preserve quotas at a higher (e.g., provincial or state) level; they can
even choose the “village redevelopment project” that can consolidate villagers into
high-rise housing to maximize the amount of transferred land (Rithmire, 2015, p. 62).
In the aspect of the development of real estate and construction industries, while
the central government continues to issue suppression policies to control the urban
housing price, local governments tend to favor the real estate developers. For example,
some cities provide private developers with concessions in the process of land leasing,
such as prolonging the deadline for land-leasing payment (Yang & Lu, 2010).
As for the supply of affordable housing, the state proposed the establishment of
affordable housing in 1998, but it was not until 2005 that local governments began the
construction of it. At the local level, the proportion of affordable housing occupying
the urban residential construction is far below the central requirement (Yang & Lu,
2010).
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Chapter 6: What can China learn from Canada?
As we all know, no matter the political environment, the fiscal system, or the
local authority and autonomy, Canada and China are completely different. It is
impossible and unrealistic to make China copy the Canadian model exactly. However,
to a certain extent, local governments in these two countries are faced with the
common dilemmas, such as fiscal constraints and heavy reliance on land-related
revenues. Therefore, this chapter chooses a specific perspective of Canada’s
pluralistic decision-making system to make it transferable and realistic for China to
learn. That is to say, even though, local governments in China cannot change the land
ownership system instantly, it is highly valuable and urgent for them to alter the
monopolistic decision-making situation and to offer the public an independent, legal,
and substantive channel to protect their property interest.
6.1. Different Contexts but Common Dilemma
Unlike China, the context in Canada is totally different. Above all, Canada is one
of the most urbanized countries in the world. From 2005 to 2015, the percentage of
the Canadian population that lived in “urban areas” as defined by Statistics Canada
has remained stable at around 80 (World Bank, 2016). Although China has a different
definition of “urban”, government statistics in 2014 classified about 54.77 percent of
the population as urbanized (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2015). In
comparison, Canada is primarily an urban nation (Sancton, 2011) and has stepped into
the stable phase. Consequently, there is no particular performance burden for
municipalities to pursue urbanization.
Next, as “the creature of provincial governments”, municipalities in Canada are
under provincial jurisdiction with limited power in making by-laws and managing

! 44!

financial resources (Sancton, 2011, p.27). Specifically, “provincial legislatures
approve laws that specifically authorize certain forms of local taxation, the levying of
user charges, and formulas for the transfer of money from the provincial treasury to
local governments” (Sancton, 2011, p.34). Instead of offering municipalities the
access to Income and Sales Tax, provincial governments have preferred to share
revenues from these sources by means of grants (Graham, 2006). For example, in
2008, local general government revenue across Canada was totaled about $73.76
billion, including $15.83 billion transfers (general and specific) and $36.52 billion in
property and related taxes (Statistics Canada, 2009). It is clear that, except these
transfers, the property tax is the most important own-source revenue for Canadian
local governments (Sancton, 2011, p.289). As shown in Figure 11, the property tax
accounts about half of the local revenues (Taylor, 2016).
Figure 11: Canadian local revenues

Source: (Taylor, 2016)
Considering the historical decline in intergovernmental transfers to local
governments since the 1980s, plus the downward pressure on local service levels
(Horak, 2016), similar to China's local governments, Canadian municipalities are
confronted with great fiscal constraint. Moreover, due to the heavy reliance on
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property tax, which is a type of land-related taxation, there is a fiscal incentive for
local governments in Canada to have a policy bias in favour of land development
(Horak, 2016). In some cases, compared to property owners, property developers may
have more substantial political influence in local land issues. However, as the city
council is elected by and responsible to the public, and the upper-level governments
have no authority to control local officials’ career promotion, one of the biggest
differences between Canada and China is that Canadian local leaders are under no
motivation to pursue personal career improvement at the expense of the public
interest and general residents’ demands.
Also, land-use planning is one of the most fundamental responsibilities of local
governments in both China and Canada. Unlike China, Canadian provincial
governments strictly control the land use authority that granted to municipalities. For
instance, in Ontario, the municipalities conduct land-use planning under the control of
Planning Act, Provincial Policy Statement(PPS), and the Ontario Municipal Board at
the provincial level (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2011). Although city
governments also want to enhance local economic development by supporting real
estate developers, there is no monopolistic authority for local officials to realize it.
And this limited, transparent, and pluralistic land decision-making system of local
governments in Canada is the key element that China needs to learn.
6.2. Pluralistic Planning Decision-making System in Urban Land Issues
Chinese local governments monopolize the power of making decisions in urban
land issues. In contrast, Canadian municipalities, citizens (sometimes appearing in the
form of neighbourhood associations), experts, private developers, and some other
stakeholders (i.e., quasi-judicial appeal bodies) share the authority in the pluralistic
planning decision-making system.
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On the one hand, opening the process to public engagement in urban land issues
is mandatory. City councils are required to hold public meetings especially referring
to land-use planning. For example, in Ontario, according to the Planning Act,
“information and material that is required to be provided to a municipality or approval
authority under this Act shall be made available to the public” (Government of
Ontario, 1990). It is this kind of substantive and legal requirement for public
participation in land-use planning that makes municipalities’ decision open,
transparent, and accountable. Such openness helps limit the capacity of the real estate
and construction industries to influence unduly the policy decisions of local
governments. In contrast, in China, given that local authorities are able to expropriate
rural land for the alleged purpose of public interest, it much more necessary to respect
public opinion in land-use planning.
On the other hand, provincial appeal boards are another important factor that
stops municipalities in Canada from being captured by interest groups. Taking the
province of Ontario as an example, the Ontario Municipal Board is an independent
provincial planning appeal body, which has wielded major influence on the urban
development (Moore.Aaron.A, 2013). It is a powerful court-like tribunal, with the
primary function of hearing an appeal on disputes concerning land-use planning
(Moore.Aaron.A, 2013, p.38). Local residents or neighbourhood associations can
appeal city councils’ decision, and the OMB hearing would judge the planning merits
of the proposal instead of the legal grounds for a council’s decisions (Moore.Aaron.A,
2013). In other words, the OMB can ignore municipalities’ stance and override their
official plans (Moore, 2013, pp. 5). With the introduction of the Ontario Municipal
Board, urban developers and citizens are equipped with a new approach to express or
fight for their interests. It makes contributions to building a pluralistic planning
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decision-making system. For contemporary China, to stop local governments’ blind
pursuit of the land urbanization, the first step is to break the existing monopolistic
planning decision-making system. The introduction of an independent appeal body
will erode the local cadres' monopolistic authoritative decision-making right.
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Conclusion
Based on all the analysis above, there are three conclusions that can be drawn.
One is that the re-centralized Tax-sharing System, the monopolistic land management
system, and the top-down economy-focused cadre evaluation system are inappropriate
incentives for local governments in China to pursue urbanization. In the process of
local officials’ blind accelerated urbanization, the crucial problem is their exclusive
power over urban land administration and the accompanying local land finance. Local
cadres rely heavily on leasing urban land to private developers to gain more revenues,
and to make themselves outstanding in the regional competition.
The second one is that the government-led land urbanization has caused
countless negative impacts. Ironically, pursuing land urbanization, which is intended
to boost local fiscal income, turns out to result in an unstable revenue source. Local
governments should realize that they cannot count on the limited land resources
forever. Otherwise, the loss of farmland is not only a kind of violation of farmers’
interest but also a threat to a country’s basic food supply. What is more serious is that
a large amount of land leased to real estate developers does not follow market rules,
which should lower housing prices for general citizens. The unreasonable high
housing price is in part because of local governments tending to increase the cost of
land to earn more land-leasing income from the private developers. Clearly, the
land-centered urbanization has caused an inevitable tension between the state and
local governments.
Finally, to completely stop China’s acceleration of land urbanization, the central
government should conduct a series of reforms concerning the fiscal system, the
property system, and even the political evaluation system, which is obviously
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unrealistic and impracticable. Actually, since the beginning of the 21st century, there
has been an active discussion about introducing a Property tax based on western
countries’ experiences. And it was first initiated in Shanghai and Chongqing as the
pilot program in 2011, with characteristics of low tax rate (0.6% in Shanghai and 0.5%
in Chongqing) and property assessment depending on the original price of houses
(Choa & Choi, 2014). Due to limited support from local governments, this pilot failed
to be extended to the entire nation (Choa & Choi, 2014). Local officials feared that
adding the Property tax would discourage people from buying houses, which in turn
would depress the demands for urban land from private developers. Apparently, local
governments prefer not to lose the handy source of land leasing income. Therefore,
under China’s current special context, the urgent and transferrable point that can be
learned from Canada relates to the pluralistic planning decision-making system. To
focus on protecting local residents’ property interests, the state should introduce an
independent appeal body to erode local governments’ monopolistic land
decision-making authority.
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